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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
vs-

:

ROGELIO LIMONTA LEYVA

:

Case No. 940684-CA

Priority No.

2

Defendant/Appellant.:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION ANP NATURE QF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's motion
to vacate sentence, dated October 21, 1994, in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, presiding.

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

When a court continues sentencing without date because a

convicted defendant has absconded from the jurisdiction and is
incarcerated in another state, does the court lose jurisdiction
to sentence the defendant?
2.

Can a defendant successfully claim that his right to a

speedy trial was violated where he absconds from the jurisdiction

at the time appointed for his sentencing and, later, appears for
sentencing without registering any objection with the court about
the delay?
Both of these issues present questions of law, reviewed for
correctness.

*[C]orrectness means the appellate court decides

the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the
trial judge's determination of law.'7

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d

932, 936 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE? AND RULES
Any relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules
are included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 27, 1989, a jury convicted defendant on three counts
of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, all second
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1994) (R. 103-05).

Defendant was not sentenced

immediately because he fled the jurisdiction and was subsequently
incarcerated, first in California, and then by federal
immigration authorities in various locations (R. 125). On March
4, 1994, after defendant's return to Utah, the court sentenced
him to one to fifteen years in prison for the three 1989
convictions (R. 242). The court stayed the sentence and placed
2

defendant on probation (Id.).
Subsequently, after defendant was convicted of a third
degree felony, the court revoked his probation (R. 191, 320) .
Defendant challenged the revocation in a motion to vacate
sentence, arguing that the underlying sentence had been illegally
imposed (R. 170-86).

The court denied the motion, resulting in

this timely appeal (R. 206-11 or addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 27, 1989, a jury convicted defendant on three counts
of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, all second
degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(ii) (R. 103-05).

The court scheduled sentencing for

August 28, 1989, and referred defendant to AP&P for a presentence
report (R. 74). Defendant was released on bond (R. 110).
Defendant's sentencing was continued five times as a result
of his failure to keep interview appointments with AP&P, motions
by defense counsel, and failure of defendant and counsel to
appear for sentencing (R. 112-13, 111, 114-116, 117, 122, 123).
Finally, at a sentencing hearing on January 16, 1990, the court
learned that defendant had left Utah, been arrested in California
for possession and transportation of methamphetamines, and was
currently incarcerated in California (Defendant's exhibit 6, pp.
3

12-13).

Accordingly, the court continued defendant's sentencing

without date and issued a bench warrant for his arrest (R. 12526) .
Upon his release from custody in California in 1992,
defendant was seized by the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), which incarcerated him in a variety
of federal penitentiaries pending a determination of whether he
should be deported (R. 238-40, 272, 274). Eventually, INS
determined that defendant should be released after completion of
a drug rehabilitation program.
On December 17, 1993, Utah placed a detainer on defendant
pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (R. 124).
Accordingly, when defendant was released from federal custody in
January of 1994, he was transferred to Utah, where he faced
sentencing on the 1989 charges (R. 233). At his sentencing
hearing, defendant did not object to the court's jurisdiction or
raise a speedy trial complaint (R. 233-45).

After considering

the rehabilitation program defendant had completed in the federal
system and the parties' joint recommendation for probation, the
court sentenced defendant to three concurrent prison terms of one
to fifteen years, stayed the sentence, and ordered defendant to
complete 36 months of probation (R. 131, 237, 244). The
4

conditions of probation stated explicitly that defendant was uto
commit no crimes'' (R. 137, 244) .
Several months later, defendant was arrested by the Utah
Highway Patrol for evading a police officer, possession of
cocaine, and several vehicle-related violations (R. 141-42).

At

the ensuing hearing on an order to show cause to determine if
defendant's probation should be revoked, defendant, now
represented by new counsel, moved to vacate his sentence.

He

alleged that the length of delay between conviction and
sentencing had divested the trial court of jurisdiction and,
thus, that his original sentence was illegal.

Consequently, the

subsequent grant of probation, he claimed, was also illegally
imposed (R. 170-86).

After briefing and a hearing on the matter,

the trial court denied the motion, lifted the stay on defendant's
sentence, and reinstated the original sentence (R. 204, 206-10).
This timely appeal followed (R. 221-22).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that by continuing his sentence without
date and by failing to file a detainer on defendant while he was
incarcerated in California, the trial court lost jurisdiction.
First, the court continued defendant's sentencing without date
because defendant, while free on bail, fled the jurisdiction.
5

Defendant has cited no persuasive legal authority for the bizarre
proposition that, by fleeing Utah and committing crimes
elsewhere, a defendant can divest the Utah court of jurisdiction
and so escape punishment for crimes of which he had been found
guilty.

And, second, the Interstate Agreement on Detainers

places no affirmative duty on a state to file a detainer at any
time.

Thus, defendant's contention that the trial court lost

jurisdiction by failing to lodge a detainer while defendant was
incarcerated in California is also groundless.
Defendant also argues that the delay in sentencing violated
his right to a speedy trial, resulting in a loss of jurisdiction
for the trial court.
reasons.

This argument fails for a variety of

First, defendant cannot even claim the protection of

the speedy trial guarantee because he voluntarily absented
himself from the jurisdiction.

Second, because defendant himself

caused the delay, his actions constituted a temporary waiver of
the right to a speedy trial.

Third, even if he could claim a

violation, it would not result in a loss of jurisdiction.

By

appearing in court without registering any objection, defendant
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. And finally,
even on the merits, defendant's claim would fail.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
WHEN A CONVICTED DEFENDANT, OUT ON BAIL AND
AWAITING SENTENCING, CHOOSES TO LEAVE THE
STATE AND IS SUBSEQUENTLY INCARCERATED
ELSEWHERE, THE UTAH COURT DOES NOT LOSE
JURISDICTION EITHER BY CONTINUING THE
SENTENCING PROCEEDING WITHOUT DATE OR BY
FILING A DETAINER SHORTLY BEFORE DEFENDANT IS
DUE TO BE RELEASED
The crux of defendant's argument is that by continuing his
sentencing without date and by failing to file a detainer on
defendant while he was incarcerated in California, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over his case (Br. of App. at 7).
The first prong of defendant's argument is that, by
continuing the sentencing without date when it discovered that
defendant was incarcerated in California, the trial court
abdicated control over the case and thereby lost jurisdiction.
For this proposition, defendant cites language from In re Flint.
71 P. 531 (Utah 1903).

The facts of that case, however, reveal

that defendant's reliance is misplaced.

In ElinL, defendant came

before the trial court, which indefinitely suspended his sentence
and released him on his own recognizance.
defendant was discharged from custody.

At that point,

Some eleven months later,

responding to a motion by the district attorney, the court called

7

defendant into court and sentenced him to a year in prison.
Flint. 71 P. at 531. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the
trial court was without jurisdiction to sentence defendant.
at 531-32.

Id.

In essence, by indefinitely suspending defendant's

sentence and discharging him from custody, the trial court closed
the case and terminated its jurisdiction over the defendant.
The Flint decision was proper and has no impact on the
instant case.

In Flint. the trial court, in effect, made a final

disposition of the case; here, the trial court reserved
sentencing until such time as it could properly dispose of the
case.

To equate the trial court in Flint indefinitely suspending

sentence and discharging defendant from custody with the trial
court here continuing defendant's sentence without date in
response to defendant's flight overlooks the fundamental
difference between the cases.

In Flint, the trial court in

essence said, "I am through with this case."

Here, the trial

court said, "I cannot now be through with this case because the
defendant's illegal acts have temporarily prevented final
disposition."

Defendant has offered no persuasive authority for

his dubious argument that a defendant may divest the court of
jurisdiction by illegally fleeing to another state.
The case much closer to the facts here is State v. Saxton,
8

519 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974).

In Saxton. defendant was convicted at

trial and subsequently failed to appear for sentencing.
Incarcerated in another state, he was eventually returned to Utah
for sentencing,

Saxton argued that because he had been free on

his own recognizance while his sentencing was pending and
because, in his absence, sentencing was indefinitely postponed,
the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
1341.

Id. at

The Supreme Court rejected defendant's Elint-based

argument, stating that the statutory time for imposing sentence
may be extended for a variety of reasons and that, nthe defendant
certainly cannot absent himself and prevent the imposition of
sentence until after that time has expired, and then take
advantage of his own wrong by insisting that the court is without
jurisdiction to impose the proper sentence."

Id. at 1342.

Saxton, then, exposes defendant's disingenuous premise —

that by

fleeing Utah and committing crimes elsewhere, a defendant can
divest the Utah court of jurisdiction and thus escape punishment
in Utah for crimes of which he had been found guilty.
The second prong of defendant's argument is that the Utah
court lost jurisdiction over him by failing to lodge a detainer
against him while he was incarcerated in California.
By lodging a detainer, a state notifies the prison
9

authorities in another state that someone in their prison system
faces charges pending in another jurisdiction.
Stilling. 770 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah 1989).

State v.

The purpose behind the

IAD is to encourage the speedy disposition of outstanding charges
*so that any uncertainty about the prisoner's status will be
dispelled, and rehabilitation and treatment can proceed
unhindered."

Dodson v. Cooper, 705 P.2d 500, 502 (Colo. 1985),

cert, denied. 474 U.S. 1084 (1986)(citations omitted).

The IAD

is designed to benefit both prisoners and the state lodging the
detainer:
The IAD benefits prisoners by providing them
with a uniform procedure to obtain an
expeditious and orderly disposition of
charges upon which outstanding detainers are
based. The IAD benefits party states by
establishing a system of cooperative measures
that allow the disposition of charges pending
in one state against a prisoner incarcerated
in another.
Stilling, 770 p.2d at 137.
Defendant, by placing an affirmative duty on Utah to file a
detainer as soon as possible, is in essence arguing that he had a
right to be returned to Utah on a detainer before being turned
over to federal immigration authorities.1

1

The IAD, however,

The self-interest inherent in defendant's position is
clear. Knowing that the INS was after him, defendant surely
10

neither saddles the State with such an obligation nor bestows on
defendant such a right.

The explicit statutory language provides

only that the IAD is triggered after a detainer has been filed
against a prisoner.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1995), IAD art.

Ill(a); United States v. Mauro. 436 U.S. 340, 343-44 (1978).
"Lodging a detainer is an informal process; it neither requires
the state lodging a detainer ('the receiving state') to pursue
custody nor requires the state in which the prisoner is
incarcerated ('the sending state') to do any act or effect any
transfer of the prisoner."
omitted).

Stilling, 770 P.2d at 137 (footnotes

Nowhere in the IAD is the State given the affirmative

duty to seek custody of a prisoner at all, let alone seek custody
as soon as a state realizes that an individual is incarcerated
elsewhere.

Thus, defendant's contention that the court lost

jurisdiction by failing to lodge a detainer against him while he
was incarcerated in California is wholly without merit.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS PRECLUDE HIS CLAIM THAT
HE WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL; IN
ANY EVENT, AN EXAMINATION ON THE MERITS
DEMONSTRATES THAT THEY WERE NOT VIOLATED

would have preferred facing charges in Utah rather than the
possibility of being deported back to Cuba.
11

To some extent, defendant seems to be arguing that the trial
court, by delaying the proceedings, violated defendant's right to
a speedy trial.2

The remedy for this presumed violation, assumes

defendant, is a loss of jurisdiction for the trial court.3

See

Br. of App. at 17. This argument depends on two false
assumptions:

first, that defendant here can claim the protection

of the speedy trial right; and, second, that violation of the
right results in a loss of jurisdiction.

Both of these matters

were resolved by the trial court:
1. Defendant was absent from his sentencing
in January 1990 because he was incarcerated
in California. However, defendant
voluntarily left Utah pending his sentencing.
He voluntarily traveled to California. He
committed new criminal acts in California.
His arrest and incarceration in California
were a consequence of his voluntary acts.
Therefore, Defendant's failure to appear for
sentencing in Utah was voluntary.
2.

Defendant cannot divest this Court of

2

Defendant fails to articulate the federal constitutional,
state constitutional, or statutory basis for this claim.
3

Sentencing is encompassed in the right to a speedy trial,
as defendant asserts. See State v. Banks. 720 P.2d 1380, 1385
(Utah 1986) ("A speedy trial necessarily contemplates not only a
seasonal trial of the facts, but also a seasonal decision and
sentencing following trial"); seefllSPGonzales v. State. 582
P.2d 630, 632-33 (Alaska 1978) (explaining in detail the
rationale for including sentencing in the right to a speedy
trial).
12

jurisdiction to sentence him by voluntarily
absenting himself from the jurisdiction of
this Court prior to imposition of sentence.
R. 208-10 or addendum A.
For the proposition that the first conclusion is incorrect
as a matter of law, defendant cites State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677
(Utah 1986) (per curiam).

In Houtz, defendant fled the

jurisdiction prior to trial, committed crimes elsewhere and was
incarcerated in another state.

The court first determined that

defendant had voluntarily absented himself from trial by leaving
Utah in violation of his bail.
defendant in absentia.

It then tried and convicted

Houtz, 714 P.2d at 678. Defendant relies

on this case for the statement that *[w]hen a defendant is in
custody, he is not free to make a voluntary decision about
whether or not he will attend the proceedings."

Id.

What

defendant ignores, however, is the Court's holding -- that "the
court abused its discretion by not continuing the trial so that
defendant's attendance could be arranged."

Id.

That is, the

basis for the reversal in Houtz -- that the trial court should
have continued the proceedings --is precisely what the trial
court did here.4

4

Certainly, had the court sentenced defendant in absentia,
he would have argued on appeal that his absence required the
13

Defendant should not be permitted to benefit from his
unlawful act of fleeing the jurisdiction prior to sentencing.

In

this case, defendant knew that he had been found guilty and was
going to be sentenced.

Indeed, but for his non-appearances and

the motions for continuance filed by his counsel, he would have
been sentenced in 1989. And, clearly, it was defendant's
responsibility to stay in contact with the court.

State v.

Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah App. 1989)(citation omitted),
cert, denied. 802 P.2d 774 (1990).

Failing in this

responsibility, he cannot now benefit by claiming that his
absence from court was involuntary:
To hold otherwise would allow a
"mischievously inclined defendant to profit
by his own wrongdoing and would be unfair to
those individuals accused of crime who are
not inclined to abscond, because the courts
would tend to revoke bail and hold all
defendants in custody to assure their
presence at all times during the trial."
i£L (citing State v. Myers. 508 P.2d 41, 42 (Utah 1973)).
Furthermore, because defendant himself caused the delay, his
actions constituted a temporary waiver of his right to a speedy
trial.

State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982)

court to vacate his sentence, arguing, again, that Houtz
controlled.
14
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From, a practical standpoint

defendant did so because it was

in his best interest.

A colloquy between the court and his trial

attorney at the hearing on the motion to vacate sentence reveals
that defendant believed the court's recommendation of probation
obviated the need for any argument or objection:
Court:

Was there any discussion at the %94
sentencing about whether or not at the
time between *90, when I issued the
bench warrant, and when I actually
sentenced in '94 , that that had -- that
delay was unacceptable, or problems?
Anything said in this courtroom
regarding that?

Counsel

Not that I recall.

Court

But there was discussions between Mr.
Leyva and you on that subject?

Counsel

That's true,

Court

As I understand, he apparently decided
because probation was recommended, and I
believe I indicated to you that that
looked reasonable --

Counsel:

Yeah, that seemed to resolve it

Court

That resolved the issue?

Counsel

Seemed to, yes,

R. 262-63
It was thus in defendant's best interest to submit to the
court's jurisdiction.

By appearing in Utah without objection,

defendant received probation and the opportunity to be a free
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Second, the reason for the delay must be analyzed.

Between

July of 1989 and January of 1990, all delays were caused by
defendant's failure to keep appointments with AP&P, the failure
of defendant or his counsel to appear for sentencing, or motions
for continuances filed by defense counsel (R. Ill, 112-13, 11416, 117, 122, 123). From January of 1990 until March of 1994,
the delay was attributable to defendant's leaving the
jurisdiction and subsequently possessing and transporting
methamphetamines in California, the illegal acts leading directly
to his incarceration in California.

To attribute this delay to a

failure on the part of the State to vigorously secure defendant's
presence ignores the primary fact that, but for defendant's act
of absconding from the jurisdiction while he was out on bail, he
would have been sentenced on January 16, 1990.

Cf. State v.

Velasquez, 641 P.2d at 116 (when a prisoner acts to delay trial,
he indicates his willingness to temporarily waive his right to a
speedy trial);

State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah

1986) (same).
The third factor examined under the Barker v. Wingo
balancing test is whether defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial.

The only relevant record evidence is a statement

by Bud Ellett, then employed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's
18
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defendant was eventually released from federal
returned *:~ TT t^ u * —

u

Notably,
custod"y

is sentencing, he did not asser4

or.

when

and
tl

r/ "

const
06)

As the "trial; court • observed, "Didn't say a word to me at

the time of sentenci ng.
put on probation.

He was as happy as a clam that he was

Basicall^ reople that don't show up for

sentencing qz *• ~ prison" sh :Ur.N

importantly,

'.he balancing test requires a.. anu*}&*s wi whether

the delay resulted in any prejudice to the* defendan4".
Banks. 720 P.2d 1386.

State v.

Defendant

^prejudicial and needless years of imprisonment

in federal
^ inging h i m

i

back to Utah for sentencing (Br. of App. at 19). This assertion
is clearly without merit

Whether or at what point T^-r-

n j

- -- -1 (

detainer against defendant had nothinq ,it .ill I P il-i wilh

In any event" the State had not yet lodged, a detainer
against defendant. Thus, defendant's action preceded -he State's
:
request and so would not have server
nv:Vp the Agreement's
fc
T T
protections. See IAD ar
T' '-"'.
i

defendant's questionable immigration status or with the INS's
handling of his case.6

Indeed, far from causing prejudice, the

delay in sentencing served as a windfall for defendant.

The

trial court explained:
The lawyer was here. The client didn't show
up, and the reason he didn't show up is he
had left the state and had gone to California
and committed a crime for which he was being
incarcerated, but anyway, he didn't show up
for sentencing. I suppose at that point in
time one of the options would have been to
sentence him absentia [sic], a non-appearing
defendant. I suppose we could do that, too,
but I think you know what happens to people
that are sentenced when they're not here.
The maximum sentence is imposed. That means
that a person will not have an opportunity
for probation like happened in this case.
R. 303.

Thus, precisely because defendant had served time in the

federal system and had successfully completed a drug
rehabilitation program, the court agreed to adopt the parties'
recommendation that defendant be placed on parole and not serve
any prison time at all (R. 304) . Had defendant not violated his
probation, he would have remained a free man and would certainly
never have claimed that his right to a speedy trial had been

6

With regard to sentences imposed by two different
sovereigns, the law presumes that the sentences should run
consecutively. State v. Reed, 709 P.2d 391 (Utah 1985)
(construing Utah Code Ann. 76-3-401).
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violated.
Defendant's significant contribution to the delay, evidenced

the complete lack of prejudice to him resulting from that selfinduced delay, compels the conclusion that he was not den i ed his
right to speedy trial.

The n i d i cc

effect, correct as a matter .r

'•
id i;e affix-tie.

;

- or

addeiicjtiin

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Cour4- ~1

^

affirm the trial

court1 " n oirlri rli'iiy i 1111 defendant 's
ORAL

I ,:

_

N OPINION

l;.«i .. tate r equestsfaotl1 oral argument and a written opinion
in this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this [ f) day of September
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Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 27, 1990, defendant was convicted of three

counts of Distribution of a Controlled Substance.

Each was a

second degree felony.
2.
date.

Following the verdict, this Court
That date was continued

set a sentencing

several times either at the

request of defendant's trial counsel, Loni Deland, or because
defendant

did not appear at the date set.

Eventually, the

sentencing date was set for January 16, 1990
3.

Sometime after the jury verdict defendant voluntarily

left Utah and went to California.

While there, defendant was

arrested on other charges and incarcerated.
4.

On January 16, 1990, the defendant did not appear.

This Court was informed that defendant did not appear because he
was incarcerated on other charges in California.

This Court

continued sentencing without date pending defendant's return.
5.

The

State

initially

did

not

file

a

detainer

with

filed a 180 day disposition notice.

No

California correction authorities.
6.

Defendant

action was taken on the 180 day notice because the Salt Lake
County Attorney1s Office determined the Utah Code Annotated

Sec.
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voluntarily traveled to California.
acts in California.

He committed new criminal

His arrest and incarceration in California

were a consequence of his voluntary acts.

Therefore, Defendant's

failure to appear for sentencing in Utah was voluntary.
2.

This Court is not convinced that a criminal defendant

has the right to a speedy sentencing.

However, if such a right

exists the four factors articulated for considering a violation
for the right to speedy trial apply.

These factors are, the

length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.
However, defendant has failed to make a sufficient showing that
these factors warrant a finding of denial of any right defendant
may have to a speedy sentencing.

Although the delay between the

verdict and the sentence was considerable, it was caused by
defendant's failure to appear for sentencing or else his counsels
request for continuances and then by defendant leaving Utah and
committing other criminal offenses in California.
not assert any right to a speedy sentencing.

Defendant did

Defendant was not

prejudiced by any delay in his sentencing.
3.

Defendant's request for disposition of untried case

within 180 days as provided by UCA 77-29-1 was not an assertion
of defendant's right to speeding sentencing.
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